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Although I have never read anything by Ramus, the little I knew about him before
reading Novak’s paper had convinced me that studying him would be useful from the
point of view of argumentation and informal logic. Novak’s paper has confirmed this
earlier predisposition of mine. Consider, for example, the fact mentioned by Novak that
in the century between 1543 and 1650 there were about 800 editions of works by Ramus.
Who could fail to be impressed by such a phenomenon? Or consider Francis Bacon’s
opinion of Ramus, as quoted by Novak:
I have nothing in common with that hide-out of ignorance, that pestilent bookworm, that begetter
of handy manuals. Any facts that he gets hold of and begins to squeeze in the rack of his summary
method soon lose their truth, which oozes or skips away, leaving him to garner only dry and barren
trifles. Aquinas, Scotus, and their followers out of their unrealities created a varied world; Ramus
out of the real world made a desert. Though that was the character of the man he has the effrontery
to prate of human utilities. I rate him below the sophists. (p. 4)

If someone can elicit such invective from a personality such as Bacon, then I, for one,
become intrigued.
Novak tells us that his aim is to give concrete content to several abstract
characterizations of Ramus’s work that are commonly mentioned. These include: antiAristotelianism, anti-Scholasticism, pedagogic revisionism, humanism, and Renaissance
character and approach (p. 1), as well as a “shift from logic as deductive to dialectical”
(p. 2) and a “shift from logic’s employment about abstract ontological/theological issues
to its application to applied multi-disciplinary topics” (p. 2).
Let us begin by focusing on Ramus’s anti-Aristotelianism. One of Ramus’s most
basic objections is that Aristotle “simply did not provide an inventive or practical way for
the mind” (p. 3). In Ramus’s own words (quoted by Novak from Aristotelicae
animadversiones):
let us look at the categories: do they contain any power of invention (discovery) and some doctrine
that is both true and useful? I here see no art, no utility of any art whatsoever, but a most
uncomfortable confusion of all arts. (p. 3)
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What does this mean? I wish Novak had provided some elucidation. Is Ramus
saying that Aristotle’s theory of the categories, even if true, is difficult or impossible to
use? But what should it be used for? Should it be usable for the understanding or
interpretation of human thought? Should is be usable for the evaluation or assessment of
the same? Should it be usable for the discovery or invention of new ideas? Is the last use
what Ramus means by the notion of providing “an inventive or practical way for the
mind”? Would such a use make it an art? And what does Ramus mean by a “confusion of
all the arts”?
Another major objection by Ramus to the Aristotelian account of the categories is
that “Aristotle […] does not treat of the more particularly relevant items and he does not
provide examples” (p. 5). What does it mean to “treat of the more particularly relevant
items”? And it is really true that Aristotle does not provide examples? And would such
examples be examples of the categories or of the of use of the categories?
Let me now focus on Ramus’s own application of logical principles to multidisciplinary topics. I shall terms this feature “applied multi-disciplinarity” for short. I
think I understand this characteristic, and Novak’s illustration is clear and informative.
The illustration involves the chapter of Ramus’s book Dialectic that discusses “efficient,
procreating and conserving cause” (p. 8).
Novak tells us that Ramus himself provided only three examples, consisting of
one quotation from Ovid and two from Virgil. Although Novak gives the precise
references for these passages, he does not reproduce the passages, but I wish he had.
However, he adds that the editor of the 1574 London edition of the Dialectic expanded
the examples to include the following (p. 8): “a quotation from Paul’s epistle to the
Romans”; a text attributed to Pythagoras; “a mathematical generation of a line from a
point”; “some remarks on efficient causes that preserve health (taken from Galen)”; a
statement from “Aristotle’s Meteorologica […] concerning the role of the sun as an
efficient cause”; “mention of contract as the cause of legal obligation”; “a reference to
Isocrates bearing on the causal role of the kingly office”; “the causality exerted by the
laws, citing Demosthenes”; “the causal role that memory plays, citing Cicero”; and “a
citation about divine causality from Porphyry’s (lost) On the History of Philosophy.” I
get the point. Certainly Novak is right when he ends this illustration of Ramus’s applied
multi-disciplinarity by saying that “one does see in this huge variety of authors,
examples, and disciplines cited that the spirit of Ramus has opened up logic in a way that
was not found in earlier texts” (p. 5).
Novak’s most sustained analysis involves chapter 21 of book I of Ramus’s
Dialectic, entitled “On Similars.” Novak reproduces the chapter in full in Appendix 4 of
his paper and has a discussion of it on the last two pages of the body of the paper. The
aim of this analysis is again to give concrete content to many of the traits usually
attributed to Ramus. Novak’s analysis is largely successful with respect to most of these
traits, except that the success is limited by the relative lack of clarity of Ramus’s passage,
as I shall try to indicate in a moment. Moreover there is one trait which I find more
problematic. It is the one described by Novak as “a certain scholastic rigor in his
presentation of material, but he simplifies the material by presenting it through definitions
and divisions, frequently governed by a dichotomizing tendency.” I am not sure I see the
rigor, scholastic or otherwise; nor do I see the dichotomizing tendency in this particular
passage. Let me elaborate (all quotations are from Novak’s Appendix 4).
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(1) A preliminary difficulty with the full text of the chapter as provided by Novak
is that it is not completely clear whether he has added glosses to Ramus’s text, for some
sentences read like comments. However, perhaps these are just Ramus’s own comments
on the examples he is quoting from other classical authors.
(2) It is not clear whether Novak had deleted any parts of the passage, since the
whole text suffers from a certain lack of smoothness.
(3) When Ramus says that “those [things] are similar whose quality is the same,” I
find this definition unclear because it seems to be expressing either one of two ideas: (a)
that things are similar when they share a single property; or (b) that things are similar
when they share all properties. But neither of these sounds right. In particular, the second
relationship would be identity rather than similarity.
(4) When Ramus states that “similar things are proportional,” I don’t know what
this means, even though I think I understand his assertion that “a similitude is said to be a
proportion.”
(5) The second indicator term is “image.” I suppose Ramus means that if a is an
image of b, then a is similar to b, although presumably the converse does not hold. Is that
correct? If so, then there are problems with Ramus’s example of this indicator term. This
is the sentence: “Sulpicius was able to leave no clearer monument than the image of his
morals, virtue, constancy, piety, genius — a son.” If this meant that Sulplicius’s son is an
image of Sulpicius, it would make sense. But the sentence also suggests that the son is an
image of Sulplicius’s morals, virtue, etc. And that seems to make no sense.
(6) Regarding the indicator term “likeness,” Ramus gives the example of Cicero’s
statement that “the day I returned to the fatherland” was “to me the likeness of
immortality.” Here it’s unclear what is the other thing to which Cicero is comparing his
return. Is it the feeling of immortality? Or is it the state of being immortal?
(7) The indicator term “just as” (sicuti in Latin) yields the example, again taken
from Cicero, that “all indeed now in these places see […] Pompey as someone not sent
from the city but fallen from heaven.” Here we seem to be dealing with the concept of
seeing a as b. It seems to me that the meaning of this concept is not that one sees or
thinks that a is similar to b, but that a is b. So I am not sure we are dealing with similars.
(8) The last two indicator terms and their corresponding examples raise the
following difficulty, in my mind. The terms are “scarcely otherwise” and “not otherwise,”
and Ramus calls them negations of dissimilitude. Thus, he seems to presuppose that
similitude and dissimilitude are contradictories. However, it seems to be that they are
merely contraries; that is, many things are neither similar nor dissimilar, but just
different. I am inclined to think that perhaps both relationships of similarity and
dissimilarity are similar in the sense that they both involve systems of properties which
similar things do, but dissimilar things do not, share.
(9) Ramus seems to distinguish disjunctive from conjunctive similitudes. A
disjunctive similitude is defined as one “when the four terms are actually distinguished,”
and illustrated with several relatively clear examples. However, no definition of
conjunctive similitude is given, unless Ramus means to imply that it is a similitude which
is not disjunctive. Why the oversight?
(10) Ramus points out that “sometimes there is no indicator term at all,” and he
gives the following verses from Virgil as a example: “O beautiful boy, do not put too
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much trust in color: / White privets fall, dark blueberries are selected.” Here the
similitude escapes me.
(11) The next concept is clearly defined and clearly illustrated: “A continuous
likeness occurs when the first term is to the second as the second to the third.” The
example is from Cicero and amounts to saying that “just as the laws preside over the
magistrates, so the magistrates preside over the people.” Here my question is, why the
term “continuous” is being used. Where is the continuity? In this connection, it should be
mentioned that in mathematics there happens to be a concept which is similar to Ramus’s
notion of “continuous likeness.” It is the concept of mean proportionality, defined as
follows: given two quantities, A and B, their third proportional is a quantity X such that
A:X = X:B.
In conclusion, I am convinced that Ramus was part of a shift in logic in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and that his book entitled Dialectic deserves more
study. Furthermore, part of this shift was a stress on applied multi-disciplinarity, which I
find relatively intelligible. However, it would be valuable to understand more clearly the
other aspects of this shift. For example, what exactly was the shift with regard to
conceptual framework, logical principles, and method (especially the dialectical
approach)?
Link to paper

4

